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Abstract
We oer a model of equality of opportunity that encompasses dierent conceptions
expressed in the public and philosophical debates. In addition to circumstances whose
eect on outcome should be compensated and eort which represents a legitimate source of
inequality, we introduce a third factor, luck, that captures the random factors whose impact
on outcome should be even-handed for equality of opportunity to be satised. Then, we
analyse how the various denitions of equality of opportunity can be empirically identied,
given data limitations and provide testable conditions. Denitions and conditions resort to
standard stochastic dominance tools. Lastly, we develop an empirical analysis of equality
of opportunity for income acquisition in France over the period 1979-2000 which reveals
that the degree of inequality of opportunity tends to decrease and that the degree of risk
of income distributions, conditional on social origin, appears very similar across all groups
of social origins.
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1 Introduction
Most economic analysis of inequality, theoretical and empirical, rely on the assumption that
equality of individual outcomes (e.g. welfare, income, health) is per se a desirable social objec-
tive. This is sometimes criticized for standing at odd with both public perceptions of inequalities
and some developments in modern theories of justice. According to this criticism, a distinc-
tion must be drawn between morally or socially justied and unjustied inequalities. This has
led egalitarian philosophers such as Rawls (1971), Dworkin (1981a, 1981b), Sen (1985), Cohen
(1989) or Arneson (1989, 1990) to claim that distributive justice does not entail the equality
of individual outcomes but only requires that individuals face equal opportunities for outcome.
Despite the growing political audience of this view, few economic analysis have tried to assess
the extent to which equality of opportunity is empirically satised.1 Two major issues are likely
to account for this state of aairs. First, how should equality of opportunity be characterized?
In fact, no consensus has been reached, neither in the philosophical nor in the public debates, re-
garding how opportunities should be dened and in what sense they should be considered equal.
In this paper we oer a model of equality of opportunity that encompasses several conceptions
expressed in these debates. Second, how can equality of opportunity be empirically assessed ?
This requires that the determinants of individual outcomes be taken into account. However,
these determinants are never fully observable. Hence, we analyze how the various conceptions
can be empirically identied, given data limitations, and provide testable conditions for equality
of opportunity. Lastly, we develop an empirical implementation of these conditions and examine
the extent to which equality of opportunity is achieved in the distribution of income in France.
One important implication of the equal-opportunity view is that judgements about equality
must take into account the determinants of individual outcomes. At least two sets of factors
must be distinguished : on the one hand, factors that are considered a legitimate source of
inequality; on the other hand, factors that do not appear as socially or morally acceptable.
Following the terminology introduced in Roemer (1998), we refer to the former determinants
1Roemer et al. (2003), O'Neill et al. (2000), Checchi et al. (1999), Benabou & Ok (2001), Bourguignon et al.
(2007), Goux and Maurin (2003), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Checchi & Peragine (2005) who analyze
equality of opportunity for income and Schuetz et al. (2005) who examine educational opportunities are some
of the exceptions.
1as eort and to the latter as circumstances. As most authors would agree, the principle of
equality of opportunity essentially requires, that, given individual eort, circumstances do not
aect individual prospects for outcome, or to paraphrase Rawls (1971, p.63), that individual
with similar eort face \the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the
social system". What factors should count as eort or circumstances is of course a crucial
point from a normative perspective. For several authors, individual responsibility should be the
relevant criterion and all factors beyond the realm of individual responsibilty should count as
circumstances. There remains, however considerable debates on this issue.
A prominent view in these debates is the one expressed by John Roemer in a series of con-
tributions.2 3 It claims that the denition of circumstances is a matter of political choice.
Furthermore, once circumstances have been dened \by society"4, remaining dierences in in-
dividual outcomes should be considered the result of eort. Hence, the distinction between
circumstances and eort turns into a dichotomic partitioning of the determinants of outcome.
As a consequence, requiring that, for a given level of eort, circumstances do not aect in-
dividual prospects for outcome, implies that individuals with similar eort should have equal
outcomes.
This dichotomic approach lies at the heart of most economic analysis of equality of oppor-
tunity. However, it does not fully account for the diversity of the determinants of outcome
and leads to a specic conception of equality of opportunity. Assuming that society has agreed
on a given set of circumstances does not imply that the remaining determinants will reect
individual responsible choice and should be treated as eort. In this respect, international atti-
tudes surveys, such as the one summarized in Figure 1, reveal two noteworthy dierences across
countries. Consider that \social injustice" captures inequalities arising from circumstances, as
dened \by society". First, countries dier in their propensity to consider that bad economic
outcomes reect social injustice, which indicates that the denition of circumstances may vary
across societies. Second, and more importantly, the gure also suggests that countries dier in
their belief in the role of eort in shaping individual outcomes, over and beyond the inuence
of circumstances.5 The assumption that the determinants of outcomes excluded from socially
dened circumstances relate to individual eort provides a good approximation of US average
beliefs. It does not however correspond to the social perception in many European countries,
2For a theoretical discussion, see Roemer (1993, 1998) and for empirical applications Betts & Roemer (2006),
Roemer et al. (2003) and Dardanoni et al. (2005).
3See Fleurbaey & Maniquet (2007) for a thorough discussion of alternative perspectives and related issues.
4Roemer (1993, p.149)
5For more detailed evidence, see among others Marshall et al. (1999), Corneo & Gruner (2002), Alesina &
Glaeser (2004) and Alesina & Angeletos (2005).
2Figure 1: Beliefs in the role of luck, eort and social injustice in bad economic outcomes
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Injustice in society
Source : World Values Survey (1990). Answers to the question : "Why are there people living in need ?".
Authors' computations excluding the following answers : It is an inevitable part of modern progress; None of
theses; Don't know.
which emphasizes the role of luck in shaping individual success.
Our purpose is to build a model of equality of opportunity exible enough to encompass this
diversity of perceptions. This requires to distinguish three generic determinants of individual
outcomes : circumstances, eort and luck. As described in the philosophical literature, justice
does not necessarily command that the impact of every kind of luck be nullied. In some
cases, luck may appear as a fair source of inequality provided that it is decorrelated from
circumstances, in short, even-handed. Consequently, it is too strong a requirement to dene
equality of opportunity as a situation where individuals with similar eort reach equal outcomes.
What equality of opportunity requires is that, given eort, no one faces more favorable outcome
prospects, as a result of luck, for reasons related to dierential circumstances.
The rst contribution of this paper is to oer a characterization of equality of opportunity
consistent with this view. Given eort, the outcome prospects of an individual are summarized
by the outcome distribution conditional on her circumstances. Our characterization rests on the
idea that equality of opportunity prevails when the conditional outcome distribution attached to
all possible circumstances cannot unanimously be ranked in terms of well-being, using the tools
of stochastic dominance (rst and second order). The introduction of luck as a determinant
of outcome fully legitimates the use of stochastic dominance instruments, and specically of
second order. Because choosing among the outcome prospects falls down into decision-making
problems under risk. If a decision maker is unable to choose among the dierent prospects,
3then EOP prevails. This leads us to distinguish several denitions of EOP.
The empirical implementation of these denitions of equality of opportunity would be
straightforward if circumstances and eort were observable. However, in practice, this con-
dition may not be easily met. In most data sets, not all the relevant aspects of individual eort
can be measured and only a subset of the relevant circumstances can be observable. We discuss
the consequences of these limitations for the evaluation of equality of opportunity. The second
contribution of the paper is to show that, conditional on further distributional assumptions, it
is still possible in some cases to provide testable conditions for equality of opportunity when
eort and circumstances are not fully observed.
We then develop an empirical analysis of equality of opportunity for income acquisition in
France, using household surveys over the period 1979-2000. In this application, we assume that
circumstances are dened by individual social background, measured by father's occupation
and we compare income distributions conditional on social origin. Our analysis of these income
distributions relies on non-parametric tests of stochastic dominance developed by Davidson and
Duclos (2000).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our characterization of
equality of opportunity. We rst review the various conceptions of equality of opportunity that
have been discussed in recent philosophical debates and then develop a comprehensive model
that accommodates these various conceptions. In section 3, we discuss the identication of
equality of opportunity when the relevant determinants of outcome are only partially observable.
In section 4, we develop an empirical analysis of equality of opportunity for income in France.
2 Equality of opportunity : Denitions
Our characterization of equality of opportunity rests on the following representation of the
determinants of individual outcomes. Individual success or failure is driven by a mixture of
deterministic and random factors. Unless explicitly specied, we assume full observation of these
determinants and their impact. The random factors can be described as real-valued random
variables. A positive value is generally described as good luck and a negative one as bad luck.
Why is it important to distinguish random from deterministic factors? From the point of view
of equality, three kinds of operation can be described. For both factors, whether deterministic
or random, we can require either to erase or on the opposite to fully respect the eect of the
factor on the outcome. The rationale for these operations is discussed in length in the equality of
opportunity literature about eort and circumstances. For a random factor, one more operation
4may be dened: to neutralize its correlation with a given set of deterministic factors. Consider
for instance the random factors associated with job search. Now take individual ethnicity into
consideration, as a deterministic factor. Equality of opportunity would probably require that
the outcome of the job search process be ethnically neutral, i.e. distributed independently of
ethnic origin. It may not entail that job search luck should be fully neutralized.In the next
paragraphs, we review on what normative principles we should decide whether a given random
factor should be neutralized, respected or decorrelated.
2.1 Luck and equality of opportunity : a brief review
In the philosophical debates on equality of opportunity, the concept of luck refers to situations
where individual control, choice or moral responsibility bears no relationship to the occurrence
of outcomes. As we now discuss, this broad concept includes the notions of circumstances and
luck that we previously referred to.6 7
2.1.1 Varieties of luck
The debates about equality of opportunity have singled out at least four ideal-type notions of
luck that can be illustrated by simple empirical examples.
First, consider two equally talented and motivated individuals whose outcome dier only
because of dierences in their family's social connections. In this situation individual actions
and their results are pre-determined by antecedent factors (family and social origin). This
illustrates the idea of social lottery developed by Rawls. It is most probably the rst candidate
to be considered as a circumstance.8 We propose to call it social background luck.
Second, consider two fraternal twins whose outcome dier only because one of them genet-
ically inherited a special talent. As in the previous example, the determinant of dierential
success, talent, lies beyond the realm of individual choice or control. One important dierence
with the previous form of luck is that a specic individual talent can be seen as constitutive
of the individual, in the sense that it denes what person she is. This second example illus-
trates the notion of constitutive luck, or Rawls' idea of a natural lottery. It includes genetically
inherited factors and we therefore propose to call it genetic luck.
Third consider two individuals with similar talent and social background. Their outcomes
6In welfare economics, the analysis of social situations in the presence of risk has revealed a conict between
the ex ante and ex post approaches. See Diamond (1967), Hammond (1981), Broome (1991), Ben Porath et al.
(1997), Gajdos and Maurin (2004) and Fleurbaey (2006). This perspective is however essentially absent from
philosophical debates on equality of opportunity.
7See Lippert-Rasmussen (2005) for a discussion of the relationship between luck and distributive justice.
8See for instance the discussion in Dardanoni, Fields, Roemer & Sanchez Puerta (2005).
5dier as a result of a lottery they could not escape. For instance, as a result of the Vietnam
draft lottery, one of them is inducted into the Army and subsequently enjoys poor outcomes,
but not the other. This is a special form of Dworkin's notion of brute luck, which represents
a situation where the individual cannot reasonably impact the probability of an event taking
place. This kind of luck can occur at any time over a life course. Vallentyne (2002) distinguishes
two types of brute luck. Initial brute luck is dened as the set of factors that inuence lifetime
prospects up to the moment when individuals can be considered responsible for their choices
and decisions. This roughly corresponds to Arneson (1990)'s idea of a \canonical moment"
where individuals become responsible for their choices and preferences. By contrast, later brute
luck denotes the luck factors that aect individual outcomes after the canonical moment. Our
example illustrates later brute luck.
Fourth, consider two individuals who both have to choose among two lotteries. The outcome
of the rst lottery is certain. The outcome of the second is random. Assume that individuals
make dierent choices and end up with dierent outcomes. The occurrence of outcomes partly
escapes individual control, although by making dierent choices, one can inuence the occur-
rence of outcomes. This corresponds to Dworkin's notion of option luck. This notion implies
that risk is taken deliberately, is calculated, isolated, anticipated and avoidable.9 We assume it
is the case in our example and refer to it as informed option luck.
2.1.2 The requisites of equality of opportunity
Whether (and how), from an egalitarian perspective, these dierent varieties of luck ought to be
compensated has been the subject of numerous papers. Their main (unconsensual) conclusion
is that not all types of luck singled out in the previous paragraphs call for full compensation.
Almost all authors would agree that social background luck should be fully compensated,
resorting to the `starting gate position' argument : some deep inequalities of life prospects
related to economic and social circumstances of birth cannot be justied by appeal to merit and
desert (Rawls 1971).10 By full compensation, we mean that justice requires that outcomes be
equal regardless of social background luck, other things being equal.
A similar argument applies to the eects of genetic luck on individual outcomes. However,
given the constitutive nature of genetic luck, compensation of its impact may conict with other
ethical values. Hence, it has been claimed that genetic luck should not be compensated, owing
9Lippert-Rasmussen (2001) and Fleurbaey (2001) emphasize the strong informational requirements that un-
derlie the notion of option luck : option luck presupposes that agents share similar subjective and objective
probabilities of outcome occurrence.
10See Swift (2005) for a discussion of the legitimacy of parental inuence on child's outcomes.
6to the libertarian principle of self-ownership which states that agents are entitled to the full
benet of their natural personal endowments (e.g. intelligence, beauty, strength) (Nozick 1977,
p.225). For some authors, this requirement should receive priority over other principles.11
From a moral point of view, compensation for all forms of luck has also been contested on
eciency grounds. The cost of this compensation can obviously be quite high. Such compen-
sation requires considerable (and costly) information on individual situations as well as strong
redistribution which may lead to large distortions, in the case of option luck. If these costs
are large enough, compensating for all forms of luck may diminish the overall well-being. This
has led some authors to formulate a restricted requirement of justice, which only calls for the
compensation of initial brute luck and avoids part of the cost of redistribution. According to
Vallentyne (2002), justice only requires that the initial value of lifetime prospects be equal
across individuals, where the initial value is computed at the onset of adulthood.12 This re-
quires compensating for initial brute luck. Of course, to the extent that later brute luck is
related to initial brute luck, compensation for the latter implies (at least partial) compensation
for the former. However, equalizing the value of initial lifetime prospects does not erase all the
impact of later brute luck on individual outcomes and individual can still end up, ex post, with
dierent outcomes as a result of brute luck. It simply makes sure that later brute luck is ex
ante even-handed, that is decorrelated from circumstances.
Lastly, three distinct views are held regarding the compensation for informed option luck.
To the extent that the risky outcomes of option luck are avoidable and result from individual
choice, some authors have claimed that inequalities resulting from option luck should not be
compensated, owing to the principle of natural reward which states that the consequences of
individual choice should be maintained. Dworkin supports that idea. A second view, expressed
for instance in Fleurbaey (1995), recommends full compensation of the outcomes of option luck.
Two distinct arguments are given in favor of this proposal. First, the fact that pure option
luck is an extremely restrictive notion of luck that is both very rarely met in practice and very
dicult to assess empirically. Second, and more importantly, the fact that not compensating
for the eect of option luck implies that small errors of choices involve disproportionate, and
thus unfair, penalties for some individuals. Lastly, some authors take an intermediate stance
and argue in favor of partial compensation of the eects of option luck. Vallentyne (2002),
11For instance, Vallentyne (1997) claims that "there are several independent moral demands, that they include
both a demand for self-ownership and a demand for equality, and that a very strong form of self-ownership [...]
constrains the demands of equality".
12According to Vallentyne, one advantage of this procedure is that the ex ante evaluation of life-time prospects
takes into account the cost redistribution. This construct is in many ways similar to the one developed by Arneson
(1989) who suggests that equality of opportunity should be dened by the equality of \preference satisfaction
expectations".
7states that equity authorizes taxation of the results of good option luck to partly compensate
individuals who suered bad option luck. Fleurbaey (2008) proposes to decompose the outcome
of option luck into two components : on the one hand, the individual choice of a specic lottery,
which belongs to responsibility factors; on the other hand, the intrinsic randomness of outcome
attached to any lottery, which is akin to luck. According to Fleurbaey, the former component
should not be compensated while the latter should to some extent be compensated. This view
is close to the one of Le Grand (1991) who claims that individuals who make similar gambling
decisions should enjoy equal well-being and therefore be fully insured and that individuals who
make dierent decisions should only bear the consequences of their gambling over their expected
well-being.
2.2 A model of equality of opportunity : circumstances, eort and
luck
Our purpose is to build an economic model of equality of opportunity exible enough to ac-
commodate the diversity of positions held in ethical debates. The previous section reveals the
lack of agreement regarding how random factors should be accounted for in the denition of
equality of opportunity. However three main conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, the
idea that the social background lottery should be included in the set of circumstances seems
beyond dispute. Second, the impact of some random factors should be respected, as in the
case of eort. Lastly, there may exist some random factors that one wants to decorrelate from
circumstances.
It seems clear from the above discussion that this model should incorporate three types of
factors : circumstances denoted by a vector c capture the deterministic or random factors that
are not considered a legitimate source of inequality; eort summarized by a scalar e includes the
determinants of outcome, either deterministic of random that are seen as a legitimate source
of inequality. Hence our notion of eort is broader than the usual denition and does not
solely hinge on the criterion of individual responsibility. Luck is captured by a scalar l and this
concept, from now on, only comprises the random factors that are seen as a legitimate source
of inequality as long as they aect individual outcomes in a neutral way, given circumstances
and eort. In this paper, we take a neutral stance on the question of what factors should count
as circumstances, eort or luck, which, in our view, pertains to moral or political debates.
Dene y the individual outcome and F() its cumulative distribution function, which is
assumed to be continuous. A type denes the set of individuals with similar circumstances. A
8variety denotes the set of individuals with similar circumstances and eort.
At this point, an important remark is in order. Among the four parameters, income, cir-
cumstances, eort and luck, we only have three \degrees of freedom". For instance, once the
distribution of outcome, circumstances and eort have been identied, we can retrieve luck.
More precisely, in this setting, the overall impact of luck can be measured by the level of
outcome that an individual reaches for a given level of eort and circumstances, for by deni-
tion, lucky individuals are the one who enjoy higher outcomes. The distribution of outcome
conditional on circumstances and eort, F(yjc;e), measures how luck aects the outcomes of
individuals of a given variety. It gives the odds of all possible outcomes that may ex ante13 occur
for an individual of this variety, as a result of the inuence of luck. Alternatively, without loss
of generality, luck may be summarized by a scalar index l. In this case, let Y (c;e;l) denote the
outcome function. Again, by the very denition of luck, this function must be strictly increasing
in l. An example of such an index l may be dened by the \rank" where the individual sits in
the distribution of outcome conditional on her variety : l = F(yjc;e).14 So arbitrarily dened,
l measures the relative degree of luck, within a given variety. By construction, l is identically
distributed across varieties, which does not imply that a given degree of luck is associated with
similar outcomes regardless of circumstances and eort.
2.2.1 A strong criterion of EOP
In this context, what does equality of opportunity require ? Since inequalities related to eort
are morally acceptable, equality of opportunity should only apply among individuals with sim-
ilar eort. Precisely, individuals with similar eort should face similar prospects for outcome,
regardless of their circumstances. This is equivalent to say that given eort the distribution of
outcome should not depend on circumstances. In turn, this requires that luck be even-handed,
in the sense that the distribution of (the results of) luck is independent of circumstances. This
criterion can be formalized by the following denition.
Definition (EOP-S)
Equality of opportunity is satised i: 8(c;c0) 8e; F(:jc;e) = F(:jc0;e).
One should emphasize that EOP-S only provides a formal denition of equality of opportu-
nity. This formal denition is compatible with a variety of substantive conceptions of equality
of opportunity, depending on one's view of how all the concrete determinants of outcome should
13See below, x 3.4 the discussion about the ex ante and ex post approach.
14A similar denition is adopted in Fleurbaey (2008).
9be classied as circumstances, eort and luck. As already mentioned, the criterion of individual
responsibility, put forward by Cohen (1989), Arneson (1989) and Roemer (1993), oers a moral
principle that can serve to dene eort. This perspective is, however, in no way essential to
our analysis. As suggested by the discussion in section 2.1, alternative principles, such as the
principle of self-ownership, may serve to dene our generic notion of eort. What matters to
our analysis is that inequalities originating in dierential eort are seen as legitimate and do
not call for compensation. To give another illustration, if we consider that eort includes talent
and ability, denition EOP-S leads to the Rawlsian conception of\fair equality of opportunity",
dened as a situation where \those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have
the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of their
initial place in the social system" (Rawls 1971, p.63).
The present model also allows to analyze equality of opportunity in the presence of option
luck. In this case, the eort variable should comprise the individual preference towards risk that
condition her choice of a particular lottery. Under this interpretation, the condition in EOP-S
implies that individuals with similar preferences should face similar lotteries independently of
their circumstances. This is consistent with the view held by Dworkin. The compensation
for option luck suggested by Le Grand (1991) would amount to place further restrictions on
the eect of luck, conditional on eort, i.e. it would require that F(jc;e) be a mass point
distribution, at the expected value of well-being for a given choice of lottery.
Finally, two particular cases of this general model can be mentioned. First, a model where
outcomes are only inuenced by circumstances and luck as in the analysis of schooling outcomes
undertaken in Jencks et al. (1972).15 In this case, EOP-S degenerates to the requirement that
the distribution of outcome conditional on circumstances, F(yjc) should be independent of c.
Luck can lead to dierences in individual outcomes as long as it remains neutral with respect
to circumstances.
The second model corresponds to the world described by Roemer where luck is not considered
per se. As the author admits (Roemer et al., 2003, p541), in his model,\luck [...] unfortunately
[...] appears as eort, because eort [is measured] as a residual after circumstances are accounted
for". In that case, F(:jc;e) degenerates to a point-mass at y(c;e). EOP-S requires that the
income y(c;e) be independent of circumstances.
15This model can be illustrated by the following citation. ` The main determinants of occupational and income
success in society lie not with the amount of education that a person gets, but with what he brings to school with
him, such as his genes, his "inherited" intelligence, his family background, and of course, his "luck" or lack of
it" (Jencks, Smith, Acland, Bane, Cohen, Gintis, Heyns & Michelson 1972)
102.2.2 EOP-S and the conception of eort
The denition EOP-S is compatible with a variety of views on how eort should be dened
and measured. In the literature, as well as in empirical applications, two main views have been
taken.
A rst possibility is the absolutist view of eort, which amounts to assume that eort can
be dened in itself, without reference to circumstances. Under this view, the distribution of
eort may dier across types.16 This view has been supported for instance by Barry17. It is not
indisputable. As Roemer argues, if we are to take seriously the idea that individuals are not
responsible for their circumstances, the denition of eort needs to be purged of any residual
inuence of circumstances. This leads to a relativist conception of eort. According to this
view eort should by construction be distributed independently of circumstances : \The choice
of a degree of eort (as measured by the percentile of eort levels within a type) as the relevant
metric for how hard a person tried, is justied by a view that, if we could somehow disembody
individuals from their circumstances, then the distribution of the propensity to exert eort would
be the same in every type".18 The choice between these two views is not an empirical matter
but reects dierent ethical conceptions of eort.19 Of course, not everyone would subscribe to
the relativist view of eort. It is far from obvious that Roemer's argument carries over to the
case where eort also includes non-responsibility factors such as genetic or option luck.
Let eA and eR denote respectively absolute and relative eort. Roemer's conception amounts
to dene eR as a function of eA and circumstances c, eR(eA;c), such that the distribution of eR
is independent of c. A natural candidate is eR(eA;c) = G(eAjc), the rank in the distribution of
absolute eort conditional on circumstances c.20
One may wonder whether endorsing the relativist view of eort allows to simplify the above
denition of equality of opportunity. Indeed, since by construction the distribution of eort is
the same across circumstances, it may be tempting to aggregate the condition in EOP-S over
eort levels. However, even under this view of eort, one can show that the condition in EOP-
S does not degenerate to a simpler condition involving only circumstances, unless we impose
additional restrictions. This is established by the following proposition.




19Along similar lines, see the example developed in Cohen (1989, pp917-921).
20A technical condition is required for eR(eA;c)) to be properly dened. The distribution of eA conditional
on c should not exhibit any mass point.
11Proposition 1
Under the assumption e = eR, EOP-S =) 8(c;c0); F(jc) = F(jc0).
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is independent of c.
Hence, under the relative view of eort, a necessary condition for EOP-S is that the outcome
distributions conditional on circumstances alone be equal across types. It is important to stress,
however, that this condition is not sucient. Hence, even in the case of relative eort, it is not
possible to collapse denition EOP-S into a condition on the distribution of outcome conditional
on c alone. To establish that the reciprocal of proposition 2 is not true, consider the following
counter-example with two types c and c0. Within each type, eR (resp. l) takes two values (L;H)
(resp. (g;b)) with equal probability. The outcome function Y (c;e;l) is given by :
type c type c'
eort eR eort eR
L H L H
luck l g 1 3 luck l g 1 2
b 2 4 b 3 4
For each level of eort, the distribution of outcome varies according to circumstances, so EOP-S
is not satised, although the aggregate distribution over eort levels are identical.
Only under additional restrictions is it possible to simplify the condition dening EOP-S.
These restrictions correspond to the model developed by Roemer.21 This model rst assumes
that the relevant notion of eort for dening equality of opportunity is relative eort. Second,
it assumes that random factors should be ascribed either to circumstances or to eort and in
no case to luck. Hence, outcome can be expressed as a function Y (c;eR) that only depends
on relative eort and circumstances and EOP-S requires that individuals with similar relative
eort should receive equal outcomes regardless of circumstances. The third hypothesis is that
the outcome function is strictly increasing in eort. In this case, although eort is not directly
observable, relative eort eR can be inferred from the observation of outcome and circumstances.
For an individual with circumstances c, eR can be assessed by the rank p where she sits in the
conditional outcome distribution, F(yjc). Let Q(pjc) denote the quantile function associated
to the distribution F(yjc) and dened by p = F(Q(pjc)jc). EOP-S requires that 8(c;c0);8p 2
21For a complete discussion of the conditions of identication of equality of opportunity in Roemer's model,
see O'Neill, Sweetman & Van De Gaer (2000).
12[0;1]; Q(pjc) = Q(pjc0)). Hence we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2
Under Roemer's assumptions, EOP-S , 8(c;c0); F(jc) = F(jc0).
2.2.3 A welfarist foundation
Now we explore another possible justication for EOP-S, in a welfarist setting inspired by
Arneson (1989) and Vallentyne (2002), and in which welfare should be equal across individuals,
only to the extent that they exercise the same degree of responsibility.
Arneson (1989) and Vallentyne (2002) propose to use the expected value of future prospects
as the relevant metric for evaluating opportunities. This is coherent with the idea that, from
an ex ante perspective, given individual circumstances, luck, and consequently outcomes, may
be seen as random processes. In this context, equality of opportunity can be dened by the
equality of the expected value of future prospects across individuals. To perform this, one can
use a specic Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u and compute the expected utility
of the opportunities for outcome oered to a given type. In this case, equality of opportunity
is dened by the following proposition :
Definition





However, the question of what utility function to choose remains problematic. Ideally,
one would like the characterization of equality of opportunity to hold for a suciently broad
class of utility functions. In the case where there is a natural ordering for the outcome under
consideration, as is the case for income, it is reasonable to focus on monotone increasing and
concave utility functions. In this context, it is obvious that the expected value of future prospects
attached to dierent circumstances c will be equal, for all possible increasing concave utility
functions if and only if the income distributions for these circumstances are equal. Hence, we
get a welfarist foundation to EOP-S.
2.2.4 Two weak criteria of EOP
Even without placing any further restriction on the distribution of income, the situation char-
acterized by EOP-S appears as a situation of strong equality of opportunity. This condition
is very stringent and may not easily be satised in practice. Consequently one may wonder
whether all situations where EOP-S is violated should be considered equivalent from the point
13of view of equality of opportunity.22
Assume that EOP-S is not satised for two types c; and c0 and a given eort level. Two
situations can arise. First, for all relative degrees of luck, one type, say c, always gets higher
outcome than the other (8l;Y (c;e;l)  Y (c0;e;l) and the inequality is strict for some levels of
l). Second, one type gets higher outcomes for some degrees of luck while the other type gets
higher outcomes for other degrees of luck (for instance, unlucky type-c do better than unlucky
type-c0 but lucky type-c do worse than lucky type-c0). Now consider the hypothetical situation
of someone who would be given the option to choose between circumstances c and c0, without
knowing her degree of luck. This is a typical case of choice under risk. In the rst case, the
outcome distribution associated with (c;e) stochastically dominates the one associated with
(c0;e). There is a large agreement among specialists of decision theory (Starmer 2000) to say
that in this case, consistent preferences under risk, should lead to choose c over c0.23 In the
second case, there is no such unanimous preference for c over c0. The rst situation represents a
clear case of inequality of opportunity while the second corresponds to a weak form of equality of
opportunity, where no set of circumstances yields an unambiguous advantage over the other.24
Avoidance of rst-order stochastic dominance is however a very weak requirement to dene
equality of opportunity and one may object that this condition is not restrictive enough. For
instance, it would consider that equality of opportunity prevails between c and c0 in the case
where all agents of type c do worse than those of type c0 except for the one with the highest
relative degree of luck. One may provide a more restrictive denition of weak equality of
opportunity by resorting to the criterion of second order stochastic dominance (SSD). It is indeed
commonly assumed that the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function exhibits risk-aversion,
which corresponds to the case where u() is concave. It is well known25 that the expected value
derived from a distribution F(yjc;e) will be greater than the one derived from F(yjc0;e) for all
increasing concave utility functions if and only if F(yjc;e) stochastically dominates F(yjc0;e) at
the second order, which we will denote F(:jc;e) SSD F(:jc0;e).26
22Empirically, this question seems highly relevant. For instance Dardadoni et al. (2005) and O'Neil et al.(2000)
both test a condition close to EOP-S and conclude that it is violated. However, they do not oer a formal ranking
criterion for situations in which this condition is violated.
23This consensus reaches well beyond the Expected Utility Theory. There is also empirical support for that
view. In some experiments (Birnbaum & Navarette 1998) individual choices may not accord with the rst-
order stochastic dominance criteria. However, as argued by Starmer (2000) this may occur in situations where
stochastic dominance is opaque to the agent.
24Van de Gaer (1993) and Van de Gaer et al. (2001) already proposed the use of stochastic dominance tools
to dene equality of opportunity in a dierent framework.
25The requirement that choices under risk be consistent with the principle of second-order stochastic dominance
(SSD) stated below does not require that the Von Neumann - Morgenstern axioms be satised. Machina (1982)
proved that this property is valid under more general conditions within the context of non-expected utility
theories.
26Formally, the denition of second-order stochastic dominance is the following :
F(:jc;e) strictly stochastically dominates F(yjc0;e) at the second order (F(:jc;e) SSD F(:jc0;e)) i: 8x 2
14Using these notations, we get the following denition of weak equality of opportunity under
risk aversion:
Definition (EOP-W1)
Weak Equality of opportunity under risk aversion is satised i:
8c 6= c0 8e; F(:jc;e) SSD F(:jc0;e):
The conception of equality of opportunity embodied in denition EOP-W1 states that,
whatever the value of eort, it is never possible to rank the opportunities oered by dierent
types using second order stochastic dominance. Hence this notion of equality of opportunity
rules out situations in which, for at least one eort level, one type would provide an unambiguous
advantage (in the sense of stochastic dominance) over other types. A special case of such
advantage, which, admittedly, represents a strong form of inequality of opportunities, is the
situation where one type would provide an advantage over other types for all values of eort.
An even weaker form of equality of opportunity than EOP-W1 is to rule out the latter possibility.
This leads to the following denition :
Definition (EOP-W2)
Very weak Equality of opportunity is satised i:
@(c;c0) such that :
8e; F(:jc;e) SSD F(:jc0;e)
and
9e such that F(:jc;e) SSD F(:jc0;e):
If EOP-W2 is satised, two situations can occur : either there exists no eort level for which
one type is unambiguously advantaged (which corresponds to EOP-W1), or, if there exists one
eort level for which one type is advantaged, than the same type is disadvantaged for at least
one other eort level. In both cases, no type can be unambiguously preferred when eort has
not been chosen yet. Hence, although it is a weaker requirement, EOP-W2 still represents an










153 Equality of opportunity : Empirical identication
If circumstances and eort are observable, it is straightforward to examine whether the require-
ments of EOP-S, EOP-W1 or EOP-W2 are empirically satised. However, in many cases, some
of that information may be missing. In this section we discuss to what extent equality of op-
portunity can be assessed when eort or circumstances are not fully observable to the empirical
analyst and derive empirically tractable implementation criteria (IC) for equality of opportu-
nity. We rst consider the case where only outcome and circumstances are fully observable.
3.1 Unobservability of eort
We only observe the distribution of outcome conditional on circumstances F(yjc) while in a
complete information setting the conditions for equality of opportunity are stated in terms of
the distribution of outcome conditional on circumstances and eort, F(yjc;e). Letting G()






Here, one may think of assessing equality of opportunity on the sole basis of observable
conditional distributions. One obvious candidate for an implementation criterion of EOP is the
equality of these conditional distributions.
Definition (IC1)
Implementation criterion IC1 is satised i : 8(c;c0); F(jc) = F(jc0).
Unfortunately, without additional conditions, IC1 does not provide an implementation condition
for EOP-S.
One interesting case arises when the distribution of eort is independent of c. This corre-
sponds to two distinct situations. First, the analyst may adopt an relativist view of eort, in
which case the independence is granted by construction. Second, the analyst may adopt an ab-
solutist view of eort. In the latter situation, nothing guarantees the independence, but it still
may be satised empirically. When adopting the relativist view, an interesting question, which
has not been addressed in the normative literature, is whether eort should also be purged of
the inuence of luck. Two opposite arguments seem relevant from an ethical perspective. On
the one hand, luck is beyond individual responsibility, which suggests that its inuence on eort
should be nullied. In this case, relative eort would be dened by eR = G(e j c;l). On the
other hand, luck diers from circumstances in the sense that we want to compensate circum-
16stances but not luck, as long as it remains neutral. If luckier individuals exercise more eort,
their higher outcome may be seen as legitimate. In this case, eort should only be purged of
the eect of circumstances. These two points of view lead to dierent conceptions of equality of
opportunity. However it is important to emphasize that they yield similar testable restrictions,
in the case where eort is not observable. Consequently, without loss of generality, we will
adopt the second view and dene relative eort as eort net of the inuence of circumstances,
i.e. eR(e;c) = G(ejc).
If besides circumstances, outcome is determined by eort and luck, then contrary to what
happens in the Roemer model, the rank in the distribution of outcome conditional on c can no
longer serve to retrieve eort, even if we assume that outcome is strictly increasing in eort. In
our framework, the rank reects the joint impact of luck and eort. For this reason, we only
have necessary (but not sucient) conditions for EOP-S, which is summarized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 3
If 8c;G(ejc) = G(e) then EOP-S =) IC1.
This result extends proposition 2. It emphasizes that IC1 is a necessary but not sucient
condition for EOP-S as long as eort is independent of circumstances.
We now turn to the assessment of weak equality of opportunity, as dened by EOP-W1. Con-
sistent with the relativist view of eort, we assume that eort is independent of circumstances.
The consequences of the unobservability of eort are more serious for asserting EOP-W1 than
for EOP-S. In a nutshell, weak equality is dened by some inequalities, conditional on eort
and circumstances, that do not survive well to integration over eort levels. Hence, in general,
it is not possible to assess EOP-W1 without observing eort.
However, when eort is independent of circumstances, we get a sucient condition for
preserving EOP-W2, given by the following implementation criterion.
Definition (IC2)
Implementation criterion IC2 is satised i : 8c 6= c0; F(:jc) SSD F(:jc0):
This condition rules out situations of strict stochastic dominance across all possible pairs of
types. It is sucient to ensure the weakest conception of EOP.
Proposition 4
If 8c;G(ejc) = G(e) then : IC2 is a sucient condition for EOP-W2.
17Proof : Assume that EOP-W2 is violated. We want to show that in this case, IC2 is not
satised. First note that
R x




E F(u j c;e)dG(ejc)du. Using Fubini's theorem
and the assumption of independence of the distribution of e w.r.t c, we have
R x




0 F(u j c;e)dudG(e). Violation of EOP-W2 implies that there exists (c;c
0) such that,
for all e, we have : 8x 2 R+;
R x
0 F(u j c;e)du 
R x
0 F(u j c
0;e)du. And there exists at
least one value of e such that this inequality is strict for some x. By integration, we have
8x 2 R+;
R x
0 F(u j c)du <
R x
0 F(u j c
0)du, and the inequality is strict for at least some x.
Hence IC2 is violated.
3.2 Partial observability of circumstances
We now consider the case where eort and some circumstances are not observable. The vector
of observable circumstances is denoted by c1 and the vector of unobservable circumstances by
c2. In this case, it is still possible to provide a necessary condition for EOP-S when eort
is independent of circumstances without any other assumption. This condition is given by
the criterion IC1, dened on observable circumstances. This is summarized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 5
If 8c;G(ejc) = G(e) then : EOP-S =) 8(c1;c0
1); F(:jc1) = F(:jc0
1).
Proof : If EOP-S is satised, we have : 8(c1;c
0
1);8c2;8e;8y; F(yjc1;c2;e) = F(yjc
0
1;c2;e).
Furthermore, if e is distributed independently of circumstances, integrating over values of e
implies : 8(c1;c
0
1);8c2; F(:jc1;c2) = F(:jc
0
1;c2)
Integrating over values of c2 implies : 8(c1;c
0
1); F(:jc1) = F(:jc
0
1).
Roemer has suggested a similar result in his own setting without luck. It is important to
stress that our result does not require the independence of unobserved circumstances vis  a vis
observed circumstances is needed. In this setting, as in Bourguignon, Ferreira & Menendez
(2007), observed circumstances will also capture the inuence of any correlated unobserved
circumstances.
One important implication of the above proposition is that when the set of circumstances is
multi-dimensional, it may be possible to test for equality of opportunity by testing condition IC1
for each circumstance separately and ignoring the other circumstances. This may be particularly
helpful in the presence of a small sample for which the partitioning based on the full set of
circumstances would lead to very few observations for each type.
18The reciprocal of 5 is however not true. Loosely speaking, proposition 5 simply states that
the values of F(:jc1;c2) and F(:jc0
1;c2) are equal on average, where the average is computed
over values of c2. Of course, this does not imply that the CDF are equal for all values of c2.
Again, assessing EOP-W1 is not achievable under partial observability of circumstances.
However a special case of EOP-W2 can be assessed, which corresponds to the case where no
visible type c1 dominates a visible type c0
1, for all possible eorts, whatever the value of their






It is still possible to provide a sucient condition for the avoidance of EOP-W3, which is
given in the following proposition.
Proposition 6
If 8c;G(ejc) = G(e) then IC2 is a sucient condition for EOP-W3.
Proof : Negating EOP-W3 and integrating the dominance relation over eort and unobservable
circumstances implies that F(:jc1) SSD F(:jc
0
1). Hence if eort is independent of circumstances,
IC2 is violated.
3.3 Ex ante versus Ex post
All conceptions of equality of opportunity discussed so far amount to equalize the prospects for
outcome that individuals face, given their eort level. These prospects obviously refer to the ex
ante distribution of outcomes, before the individuals know their degree of luck. Of course this
ex ante distribution is never observable empirically. At best, what we can recover is the ex post
distribution of outcome among individuals of a given variety. The empirical characterization
of equality of opportunity undertaken in the previous sections rests on the assumption that
the ex ante prospects oered to individuals of a given variety can be identied with the ex
post distribution of outcomes among individuals of that type. In other words, what is required
is a law of large numbers implying that the frequency distribution in the cross section be
identical to the probability distribution for the individual.27 This reduction hypothesis raises
some empirical issues and requires specic conditions that, although unavoidable, deserve to be
explicitly stated.28
The rst problem is common in statistical inference. In some cases, the size of the sample
27See Judd (1985).
28We thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this problem.
19may be too small to prevent a noticeable dierence between the probability and the frequency.
In testing stochastic dominance, we have to keep an eye on the size of the sample.
The second problem is more specic to the reduction hypothesis implicitly made thus far.
By construction, all individuals within a variety are oered similar ex ante prospects. But this
will only correspond to the ex post distribution of outcome if individuals independently draw
from the ex ante distribution. In some cases, however there are reasons to expect outcomes to
be correlated within a type. For instance, the children of farmers are more likely to become
farmers themselves and thus, are exposed, in any given year, to common weather shocks. Hence,
the ex post distribution of yearly income may dier from the ex ante distribution of prospects.
In this simple example, one may think that using repeated observations of yearly income may
help solve the problem. But in some cases, there may be some path-dependency at the type
level. For instance, it can occur that a generation of farmers has been hurt by bad weather
conditions at the beginning of their professional life, which forced them to sell their land to
banks and to become tenants for their remaining life. As a result, the income level of the whole
type has been lowered. In this case, although ex ante, their life chances of income may have
been the same as for people living in cities (assumption), it is no longer not true ex post. But
in this case, one may wonder how relevant the ex ante distribution turns out to be.
In summary, in any empirical implementation, whatever the cautions one can take, we have
to admit that it is an ex post view that it is tested. Is it annoying? Since ex ante EOP may be
always true if we go suciently back in time, a robustly observed ex post view may defended
as the right one as well. As Marc Fleurbaey (2008) wrote\taking the ex-post point of view does
not imply ignoring individuals' ex ante life and sense of agency, it simply consists in looking
at their ex ante life with the benet of hindsight about the ex-post distribution of luck". This is
exactly what we attempt to do in practical terms.
3.4 Summary
To summarize the main conclusions of this section, equality of opportunity can be empirically
assessed using the conditions IC1 and IC2, in the case where eort or some circumstances are
not observable. We need to compare the cumulative distributions of income, conditional on
observed circumstances. Since IC1 is only a necessary condition for equality of opportunity
in the general model, we can only draw rm conclusions in the case where the cumulative
distributions are not found equal. This case indicates that equality of opportunity, as dened
by EOP-S is violated. The situation where the cumulative distributions are found equal is only
20indicative of equality of opportunity: we can only conclude to equality of opportunity if we
are willing to consider that the determinants of outcome excluded from the circumstances only
reect either luck or eort.
Since it is also well-known that SSD is equivalent to generalized Lorenz dominance, IC2
requires to compare the generalized Lorenz curves associated with observed circumstances.
When comparing two generalized Lorenz curves, three situations can occur: (a) the two curves
are identical, (b) the two curves intersect, (c) one curve lies above the other. Case (a) is
equivalent to the equality of the cumulative distributions, which has already been discussed.
Case (b) entails very weak inequality of opportunity, as dened by EOP-W2 or W3. It also
implies weak equality of opportunity in the sense of EOP-W1 if we are willing to assume that
the determinants of outcome excluded from the circumstances resort to luck or to eort alone.
Lastly, case (c) is suggestive of a deviation from equality of opportunity for two reasons : rst,
EOP-S is not satised; second we cannot even rule out the situation of strict dominance between
two observed types. Case (c) corresponds to the situation of second-order stochastic dominance
of one observable conditional distribution over the other. A special case of this situation is
the case of rst-order stochastic dominance. This case is worth investigating in its own right,
since FSD signals a strong deviation from equality of opportunity with a full ranking of the
opportunity sets oered to individuals with dierent circumstances whatever the attitude of the
decision maker towards risk.
4 Empirical application : income in France, 1979-2000
In this section, we analyze equality of opportunities for income in France. To this end, we
examine whether income distributions conditional on social origin are equal or exhibit stochastic
dominance patterns. We rst present the data and the statistical procedure used in the analysis.
We then discuss the results.
4.1 Data
The data come from the French household survey "Budget des Familles" (BdF) conducted by
the French national statistical agency (INSEE). Five waves of the survey have been collected
(1979, 1984, 1989, 1994 and 2000), each on a sample of about 12,000 households. We use all
available waves.29 For each household, the data provide detailed information on all sources
29We use sample weight to ensure sample-representativeness.
21of income and expenditures and enable to identify the household's social background. Sample
summary statistics are presented in appendix table A-1.
4.1.1 Main variables
All waves of the BdF data contain information on the social origin of heads of household and
their spouse. Both are asked to report the one-digit occupational group of their two parents.30
From these four variables, it would be possible to build a detailed classication of social origin.
Given the size of our samples, the use of a detailed classication would lead to small sub-samples,
and to inaccurate estimations of the income distributions conditional on social origin. For this
reason, we only use information on the occupational group of the household head's to dene
individual circumstances. This leads to distinguish the following six social origins: farmers,
artisans, higher-grade professionals, lower-grade professionals, non-manual workers and manual
workers. 31.
The outcome variable we focus on is household standard of living. The BdF data provide a
detailed record of all income sources including wage and labor income, asset income, transfers
(pensions, unemployment benets, child support, welfare benets) as well as income and prop-
erty taxes. We consider two measures of family income. The rst one is primary income, which
includes labor and asset income, and unemployment and pension benets. The second one
corresponds to disposable income and is equal to primary income plus redistributive transfers
minus taxes. In both cases, we normalize family income by family size using the OECD equiv-
alence scale. To make income measures comparable over time, income is expressed in constant
terms (2002 Euros) using the consumer price index.
Consequently, our data set provide a comprehensive measure of one fundamental individual
outcome : living standard. It also oer a characterization of an important determinant of
this outcome, that most authors would agree to include among the set of relevant individual
circumstances. On the contrary, it oers no measure of individual eort or luck and provides
only an incomplete description of circumstances. Therefore, the empirical assessment of equality
of opportunity that our data allow corresponds to the situation analyzed in section 3.2.
30For every survey, except 1979, it is the occupational group when the respondent was 16. In 1979, it is the
last occupational group of the parents.
31These six groups correspond to the French INSEE job classication. Children of artisans also include the
children of small proprietors. The occupational groups of the 1979 survey have been recoded to account for the
change in the occupational classication that occurred in 1982.
224.1.2 Sample selection rules
Within a given survey wave, changes in the social structure over time imply that the age
composition will dier across groups of dierent social origin. For instance, the rise in the
share of higher-grade professionals and the fall in the share of farmers implies that children of
higher-grade professionals (respectively farmers) will be younger (resp. older) than the average.
To avoid this composition eect, our sample is limited to households whose head was between
30 and 50 years old at the time of the survey. We also exclude households whose head was
retired or student at the time of the survey. Another advantage of this sample selection rule is
that household income will be more representative of their lifetime income (Grawe 2006). This
leads to samples of about 4 000 households in each wave.
The early waves of the survey exhibit a high rate of non-response to the questions pertaining
to income earned and taxes paid. In some case, information is missing for one or several income
items. In others, respondents only report some income items in bracketed form. In these
data, non-response cannot be considered random. It is correlated with the occupation of the
head of household as well as with other socio-demographic characteristics, and is stronger for
self-employed workers (farmers and artisans) than for wage earners. Hence, ignoring missing
data would lead to a biased view of the income prospects conditional on social origin. For
this reason, in case of non-response, household income has been imputed, using the simulated
residuals method. For observations with missing or bracketed data, we predict income using
an estimated income equation. This equation is estimated on those households who report
an income (in level or in brackets), and income is regressed on observable characteristics (age,
sex, occupational group, last diploma, consumption, nationality, family composition, geographic
area of living :::)32. In case of missing data, we also draw a residual term that is added to the
predicted income. This procedure is implemented to impute primary and disposable income.
The income distribution estimated using this imputation procedure appear consistent with the
distributions obtained from administrative data. This is true, in particular, for farmers' income
that was especially badly reported in the rst waves of the survey.33
32Detailed equations are available upon request.
33As we will discuss, part of the results reported below are driven by changes in the income distribution
of farmers, estimated from our data. Consequently, we were concerned that part of these evolutions may
reect spurious changes in income distribution related to changes in reporting behavior. Hence we compared
the estimated income distribution of farmers to the ones obtained from agricultural national accounts. As
documented in Lefranc et al. (2004), it turns out that our estimates are strongly consistent with those obtained
from administrative sources.
234.2 Statistical Inference : General principles
Here, we explain the general principles of our statistical methodology. The details of the stochas-
tic dominance tests we implement are presented in the Appendix. Our samples allow to build
income distribution conditional on social origin and test whether conditions IC1 or IC2 are
satised. Assessing equality or stochastic dominance relationships is a demanding exercise. It
requires that the entire outcome distributions (or some integral of them) be compared for all
possible circumstances. One should also bear in mind that these distributions need to be esti-
mated and compared, in our case using samples of relatively small size. Hence, special attention
must be paid to the statistical robustness of the conclusions drawn from sample data. In this
context, performing parametric tests of stochastic dominance is likely to yield fragile conclu-
sions. On the contrary, our empirical analysis rests on non-parametric stochastic dominance
tests developed in Davidson and Duclos (2000), which lead to robust conclusions.
The empirical procedure we implement is the following. For all possible pairs of circum-
stances c and c0, we perform three tests independently : (1) we test the null hypothesis of
equality of the distributions of types c and c0; (2) we test the null of rst-order stochastic
dominance of the distribution of type c over type c0 and vice-versa; (3) we test the null of
second-order stochastic dominance of the distribution of type c over type c0 and vice-versa.
Test (1) corresponds to condition IC1 and tests (2) and (3) to IC2. For any pair of types,
we interpret the joint results of these tests in the way summarized below. Of course, this
interpretation is only temptative and one should keep in mind the caveats discussed in section
3.4.
 If we fail to reject the null of test (1), we say that equality of opportunity is supported,
since IC1 is satised.
 Else, if test (2) or (3) accepts dominance of one distribution over the other but not the
other way round (e.g. F(jc) SSD F(jc0) and F(jc0) SSD F(jc)) we say that equality of
opportunity is violated, since neither IC1 nor IC2 are satised.
 Else, if test (3) rejects dominance of each distribution over the other ((i.e. F(jc) SSD
F(jc0) and F(jc0) SSD F(jc))) we say that weak equality of opportunity is supported,
since IC2 is satised but not IC1.
 Else, if test (2) or (3) conclude that the two distributions dominate each other ((i.e.
F(jc) SSD F(jc0) and F(jc0) SSD F(jc))), we give priority to the result of test (1) since
24it is a more powerful test of equality of distributions for any signicance level. Hence, we
say that only weak equality of opportunity is supported, since IC2 is satised but not IC1.
Lastly, one should note that, given our interpretation, conclusions of test (2) and (3) cannot
contradict since the null of (2) is included in the null of (3). Thus the conjunction of the results
of the three tests interpreted in this way cannot be inconsistent.
4.3 Results
In this section, we rst report the results of the tests of equality and stochastic dominance, for
the income distributions conditional on our partition of social origin. While we use all available
waves, we only report in the main tables and gures the results for 1979 and 2000, since our
discussion mostly focus on the initial and terminal waves. Results for other years are reported
in the appendix.
Three main conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, equality of opportunity is not
satised : for most pairwise comparisons of types, we nd evidence of stochastic dominance
relationships; overall, a clear hierarchy of the dierent groups of social origin emerges. Second,
the pattern of inequality of opportunity is stable over time : the relative ranking of types remains
almost constant across the period 1979-2000. Third, the degree of inequality of opportunity
decreases over time : while the ranking of types is unchanged, the income distributions of the
dierent types come closer together over the period.
We then examine what factors account for inequality of opportunity. As discussed in decision
theory, two factors may contribute to stochastic dominance between two income lotteries :
dierences in the expected return of the two lotteries and dierences in the degree of risk of
the two lotteries. In our case, the expected return corresponds to the mean income for each
type and risk corresponds to within type inequality. Our results indicate that the degree of risk
is very similar for all types. This is true over the entire period. On the contrary, the returns
dier markedly across types. Since the evolution of these returns is a key determinant of the
narrowing of the income prospect gap, we nally analyze the determinants of the changes in
theses returns over time.
4.3.1 A reduction in the degree of inequality of opportunity
The cumulative distribution functions and the generalized Lorenz curves conditional on social
origin are given in Figures 2 and 3 for 1979 and 2000. For 1979, a particularly clear ranking of
social types emerges. Children of higher-grade professionals stand out as the most advantaged
25type : their conditional distribution dominates by far those of other social groups. Children of
lower-grade professionals come next, followed by children of artisans and children of non-manual
workers. In fact, the income distributions of the latter two groups seem very close, especially
in the rst half of the distribution. Lastly, at the bottom of the social hierarchy, come the
children of manual workers and the children of farmers. The income distribution of the children
of farmers, in 1979, is, by far, dominated by all other social backgrounds.
This\visual"ranking is strongly supported by the results of the tests of equality and stochas-
tic dominance. These results are presented in Table 1, for primary and disposable income. In
1979, in all but one pair-wise comparisons, the equality of the conditional income distributions is
rejected. Without ambiguity, this indicates that EOP-S is not satised. The only two types who
apparently face equal opportunities are the children of non-manual employees and of artisans,
although one should keep in mind, here and in the rest of the paper, that IC1 is only a necessary
condition for EOP-S. Furthermore in all other pair-wise comparisons, the tests indicate that
one distribution dominates the other. Hence we cannot even dismiss the case where EOP-W2
is violated. One should also note that in all these cases, stochastic dominance is satised at the
rst order, which implies that a ranking of social types can be achieved without assuming risk
aversion. Lastly, in 1979, the impact of taxes and transfer on inequality of opportunity, is very
limited. The gap between the generalized Lorenz curves is slightly lower for disposable income
than for primary income (see gure 3), but stochastic dominance relationships are not aected
by redistribution.
The pattern of stochastic dominance relationships exhibits small changes between 1979 and
2000. The results of the tests for primary income are given in Table 1. Four important features
can be underlined. First, the dominant position of the children of higher-grade professionals re-
mains unchallenged during the entire period: in every wave their income distribution dominates
those of all other groups. Second, the hierarchy of intermediate groups tends to weaken. This
is in great part due to an improvement of the relative ranking of the children of artisans : in
1979, this type was dominated by children of lower-grade professionals and their opportunities
were equal to those oered to children of non-manual workers; this is no longer the case after
1994. In 2000, the opportunities oered to children of artisans are equal to those oered to
children of lower-grade professionals and dominate those of children of non-manual workers.
In this intermediate group, one can also notice a change in the relative ranking of children of
lower-grade professionals and non-manual workers. As the table in appendix demonstrates in
1989 and 1994, the income distribution of these two groups are equal, although it is no longer
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Notes : The occupational group refers to social origin. H-grade prof. : higher-grade professionals; L-grade
prof. : lower-grade professionals; Non-man. workers : non-manual workers.Figure 3: Generalized Lorenz curves in 1979 and in 2000
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Notes : Income in Euros 2002 is represented on the y-axis. The occupational group refers to social origin.
H-grade prof. : higher-grade professionals. L-grade prof. : lower-grade professionals. Non-man. workers :
non-manual workers.
true in 2000. The third important phenomenon that takes place over this period occurs at
the bottom of the hierarchy. In 2000 the conditional distribution of the children of farmers
dominates the distribution of children of manual workers. This group is now dominated by all
the others social backgrounds. Overall, a three-levels hierarchy persists over the entire period. It
is dominated by the children of higher grade professionals. In the middle comes an intermediate
group that includes the children of lower-grade professionals, artisans and non-manual workers.
At the bottom, come the children of farmers and manual workers.
While the ranking of social backgrounds has changed, one may nevertheless be tempted to
conclude that equality of opportunity has not made any good progress over the period 1979-2000.
In all waves, equality of opportunity is rejected in at least 80% of all pair-wise comparisons. In
28Table 1: Stochastic dominance tests
A- Primary Income
1979 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
Artisans - - <1 <1 = >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - >1 >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
2000 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 ? >1
Artisans - - <1 = >1 >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - >1 >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
B- Disposable Income
1979 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
Artisans - - <1 <1 = >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - >1 >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
2000 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 <1 >1
Artisans - - <1 = >1 >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - >1 >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
Notes : The occupational group refers to social origin. H-grade prof. : higher-grade professionals. L-grade prof. : lower-grade professionals.
Non-man. workers : non-manual workers.
Each element in the table indicates the result of the comparison of the income distribution of the groups in row and column using the
tests presented in section 4.2 :
>i: the row dominates the column for order i stochastic dominance ;
<i: the column dominates the row for order i stochastic dominance;
=: the distributions are equal;
?: the distributions cannot be ranked using rst and second order stochastic dominance.
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2000, IC1 is only satised in one case and IC2 prevails in another one. Hence, a strict ranking
of all types is almost always possible.
IC1 is clearly violated in France. Given proposition 2, this implies that EOP-S is violated, for
anyone who agrees that the fraction of any income determinants that is correlated with father's
occupation should be treated as a circumstance and not as eort, in the practical denition of
equality of opportunity .34 IC2 is also clearly violated. Then under the same proviso, given
proposition 3, we cannot even dismiss that one type is dominated by some other type for every
level of eort .
Despite this stability in the ranking of social backgrounds, the comparison of the generalized
Lorenz curves for the rst and the last wave (see gure 3) clearly indicates that the income
distributions of the dierent types have come closer together between 1979 and 2000. This
suggests that the change at work is more cardinal than ordinal. While inequality of opportunity
continues to prevail, the degree of inequality of opportunity seems to weaken.
A cardinal assessment of this decrease in inequality of opportunity is now proposed in Figure
34This would apply to determinants as diverse as hours of work, work diligence, genes, preferences, knowledge,
education, connections, beliefs,...
304. We compute an inequality of opportunity index consistent with our stochastic dominance
approach and derived from the Gini coecient. The detailed presentation of this so-called
Gini-opportunity index (GO) and its properties is given in Lefranc et al. (2008).35 Over the
period we observe a sharp drop of the GO index at a decreasing rate. The level of inequality of
opportunity in 2000 is 40% lower than in 1979. The same trend does not occur for the income
inequality measured by the Gini coecient which shows a much less drop. Interestingly, social
immobility measured by the Chi-two index36 witnesses a dierent evolution. After a sharp drop
up to 1995, social immobility starts to rise again slightly in the last period contrary to the
GO. This divergence demonstrates that changes in inequality of opportunity do not only mirror
changes in social immobility. We expand on that point in the last subsection.
We now turn to the analysis of this cardinal change. To do so, we analyze the degree of risk
and the return attached to the dierent conditional income distributions.
4.3.2 The risk of social lotteries
As already discussed, stochastic dominance relationships among income lotteries can arise be-
cause of dierences in their expected return or in their degree of risk. In the present context,
the expected return is dened as the mean income conditional on social origin and the risk
corresponds to within-type inequalities. Note that in the general model of section 2 the income
lotteries oered to individuals correspond to the income distribution conditional on their cir-
cumstances and eort. Return and risk should be computed from these distributions. In our
case, we do not observe individual eort. Hence, within-type inequalities will reect the joint
inuence of luck and eort.37 This remark should be kept in mind throughout this section.
The degree of risk of the dierent social lotteries can be analyzed using the Lorenz curves of
the distributions of income conditional on social origin. Consider two lotteries A and B. The
lottery A is less risky than B if its Lorenz curve is always above the curve of B. In this case,
lottery A is said to Lorenz-dominate lottery B. If the two Lorenz curves are identical then the
35The denition of this index comes as follows. Let us rank all types according to twice the area under its
conditional GL curve, starting from the smallest one. For type s, whose population share is ps, this area is equal
to
s(1   Gs); (2)













pjpk where pjk represents the proportion of individuals of social origin j and social
destination k:
37Eort can nevertheless be seen as a source of moral hazard and is therefore akin to a form of risk.
31two social lotteries are equally risky. Consequently, to compare the degree of risk of the dierent
social lotteries, we can resort to the same testing procedure as for stochastic dominance.
Table 2 displays the results of the tests of Lorenz dominance. The Lorenz curves of the
dierent social lotteries are very similar. For primary income, tests conclude to the equality of
the Lorenz curves, in 9 comparisons (out of 15) in 1979, 5 in 1984, 12 in 1989, 11 in 1994 and
10 in 2000. The tests conclude to dominance in only one case in 1979, 3 in 1984, 2 in 1994 and
0 in 1989 and 2000. Hence, the dierent social lotteries exhibit very similar degrees of risk.
A slightly dierent picture emerges from the analysis of the Lorenz curves of disposable
income, for the end of the period. First, in 2000 (as well as in 1994), the Lorenz curve of
the children of manual workers dominates that of all most other groups, with the exception of
the children of non-manual workers and lower-grade professionals. In other words, the income
distribution for children of manual workers exhibits the smallest degree of risk. Second, at the
end of the period, the income distribution of children of farmers and, to a lesser extent, artisans,
tend to exhibit more risk than those of children of wage earners.
Overall, these results suggest that social origin mostly inuences the distribution of outcomes
as a scale factor. On the other hand, the combined inuence of eort and luck is such that
the relative prospects are roughly similar across types. This implies that income conditional on
social origin can be represented by the following multiplicative model:
yic = E(y j c)i (4)
Where yic represents income of individual i with social origin s, E(y j c) is the income mean
conditional on c and i a random term whose distribution is independent of social origin.
The strong similarity in the degree of risk attached to the dierent social backgrounds
explains why in most cases, rst-order stochastic dominance is a sucient criterion for ranking
conditional income distributions.38 In fact, in this context, equality of opportunity can be
assessed by relying solely on comparisons of mean conditional incomes. This situation is a
priori quite rare.
38The rare exceptions arise when comparing children of non-wage earners to children of wage earners. Due
to the higher risk in the distribution for the former group at the end of the period, expected return and degree
of risk sometimes point to opposite directions. For instance in 1994, as will be discussed in the next section,
the mean disposable income is 5% larger for children of artisans than for children of lower-grade professionals.
However, the stochastic dominance test turns out to be inconclusive due to the higher degree of risk of the
lottery of children of artisans.
32Table 2: Lorenz dominance tests
A- Primary Income
1979 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - ? = = = <
Artisans - - = ? ? ?
H-grade prof. - - - = = ?
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - =
2000 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - = ? ? ? <
Artisans - - = = = ?
H-grade prof. - - - = = =
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - =
B- Disposable Income
1979 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - ? = = < <
Artisans - - = = = =
H-grade prof. - - - = = ?
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - =
2000 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - = = ? < <
Artisans - - = = = <
H-grade prof. - - - = = <
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - =
Notes : The occupational group refers to social origin. H-grade prof. : higher-grade professionals. L-grade prof. : lower-grade professionals.
Non-man. workers : non-manual workers.
Each element in the table indicates the result of the comparison of the Lorenz curves of the groups in row and column using the criterion
of Lorenz dominance :
>i: the row dominates the column for Lorenz dominance ;
<i: the column dominates the row for Lorenz dominance;
=: the Lorenz curves are equal;
?: the Lorenz curves cannot be ranked using Lorenz dominance.
334.3.3 The expected return of social lotteries
We now compare the expected returns of the dierent social lotteries. These expected returns
can be summarized by the mean income conditional on social origin.
Trends in conditional mean income Mean incomes conditional on social origin are given in
Table 3. This table conrms the evolution apparent in Figure 3 : mean conditional incomes tend
to converge between 1979 and 2000. The ratio between the mean income of the most advantaged
group (children of higher-grade professionals) and the least advantaged one (children of farmers
in 1979 and of manual workers in 2000) falls from 1.89 to 1.46 for disposable income and from
2.04 to 1.63 for primary income. The advantage of children of higher-grade professionals falls
by one half relative to the least advantaged group and diminishes relative to every other social
background. More generally, the increase in the mean income of the dierent social groups is
inversely related to their initial rank.
Table 3: Mean income conditional on social origin or destination
A- Mean income conditional on social origin
Primary Income Disposable Income
1979 2000 1979 2000
Farmers 12 874 17 541 12 914 17 395
Artisans 19 295 20 174 18 137 19 691
H-grade prof. 26 375 24 543 24 490 23 033
L-grade prof. 21 225 20 511 20 055 19 534
Non-man. workers 17 379 17 720 16 884 17 747
Manual workers 14 612 15 008 14 592 15 709
Mean Income 16 503 18 313 16 070 18 180
B- Mean income conditional on social destination
Primary Income Disposable Income
1979 2000 1979 2000
Farmers 9 367 17 858 9 614 17 449
Artisans 17 090 19 833 15 797 18 972
H-grade prof. 28 513 30 642 26 104 27 604
L-grade prof. 19 048 20 185 18 304 19 672
Non-man. workers 14 009 13 327 13 999 14 199
Manual workers 12 264 13 113 12 738 14 357
Mean Income 16 503 18 313 16 070 18 180
Notes : incomes in 2002 Euros. In panel A, the occupational group refers to
social origin; in panel B, to social destination. H-grade prof. : higher-grade
professionals. L-grade prof. : lower-grade professionals. Non-man. workers :
non-manual workers.
The increase in mean income is particularly strong for children of non-wage earners: children
34of farmers increase their mean income by 34.6%; children of artisans by 8.5%. As a result chil-
dren of non-wage earners improve their relative position relative to all other social backgrounds.
This contributes to the fall in the degree of inequality of opportunity since the initial ranking
of both groups was relatively low : in 1979, children of artisans ranked third and children of
farmers ranked last. The results for non-wage earners should be interpreted with caution due to
the high rate of non-response discussed in section 4.1.2. However, the growth in non-wage earn-
ers mean income reported here is very close to what is observed using non-declarative sources
such as national accounts. Moreover, most of this increase occurs during the 1990's, a decade
for which we performed very few imputations. Hence, it is most unlikely that the erosion of
higher-grade professionals' position and the improvement of non-wage earner's lot documented
here arise from a statistical artifact. They reect important changes in the extent of inequality
of opportunity that need to be analyzed.
Decomposition This fall in the dispersion of mean incomes conditional on social origin may
be related to fairly distinct phenomena. First it may originate from an increase in social
mobility: if mobility increases, conditional mean incomes converge, as the distributions of social
class destinations come closer together. Second, it may come from a reduction in the dispersion
of mean incomes conditional on social origin and social destination. We refer to the rst eect
as the mobility eect, and to the second as the return eect.
The return eect can itself be decomposed into two eects, an absolute and a relative one.
The absolute eect corresponds to a reduction in the spread of mean incomes conditional on
social destination. The relative eect is detected by computing the ratio of the mean income
conditional on social origin and social destination over the mean income conditional on social
destination. Not all occupations classied under the same destination yield the same income.
Coming from a high social origin may help occupy better paid jobs within each social destination.
This phenomenon may lead to dierences in mean income conditional on social origin and
destination, once destination has been controlled. If these dierences decrease over time, a
relative return eect has been detected.
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35Table 4: Occupational group transition matrices
A- 1979
Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers Total
Farmers .225 .074 .047 .116 .14 .396 .216
Artisans .009 .234 .192 .219 .147 .195 .139
H-grade prof. .009 .033 .51 .261 .133 .05 .069
L-grade prof. .000 .045 .287 .401 .138 .127 .073
Non-man. workers .006 .057 .144 .295 .197 .298 .111
Manual workers .005 .083 .064 .209 .164 .474 .389
Total .053 .093 .134 .218 .156 .343 1.00
B- 2000
Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers Total
Farmers .218 .049 .100 .159 .146 .325 .105
Artisans .004 .118 .205 .251 .191 .229 .122
H-grade prof. .005 .044 .415 .318 .119 .097 .150
L-grade prof. .001 .055 .222 .349 .175 .186 .085
Non-man. workers .007 .056 .137 .275 .232 .290 .184
Manual workers .005 .047 .066 .192 .198 .490 .351
Total .028 .058 .166 .243 .184 .318 1.00
Notes : the table gives the distribution of social destination (in column) conditional on social origin. The rows and columns labelled
`Total' give the column (resp. row) marginal distribution. Example: in 2000 sample, 10.5% of the population are children of
farmers, 2.8% are farmers, and 4.9% of the children of farmers are artisans. H-grade prof. : higher-grade professionals. L-grade
prof. : lower-grade professionals. Non-man. workers : non-manual workers.
the mean conditional on social destination. A change in  reects a mobility eect, a change
in yt
k, an absolute return eect, and a change in rt
jk a relative return eect. We begin with
a description of the direction of these eects over the period we study before moving to a
decomposition analysis  a la Oaxaca-Blinder.
The evolution of social mobility is summarized by the mobility matrices given in Table 4.
The matrices indicate a rise in social mobility for several social groups. For example, children of
higher-grade professionals see their probability of becoming higher-grade professionals fall from
51% in 1979 to 44% in 2000, while in the meantime the proportion of higher-grade professionals
in the total population has increased. Children of farmers experience a large increase in upward
mobility : while their probability of becoming farmer remains unchanged, the probability that
they become higher-grade or lower-grade professionals increases between 1979 and 2000 and the
probability that they become manual or non-manual workers decreases. Again, the mobility
eect accounts for part of the change in mean incomes conditional on social origin.
As documented in Table 3, mean incomes conditional on social destination tend to partly
converge between 1979 and 2000. Higher-grade professionals experience slower income growth
36Table 5: Relative return eect
A- 1979
Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers .95 .82 .93 .96 .95
Artisans .94 1.08 1.05 .98 1.13
H-grade prof. 1.31 1.09 1.15 1.35 1.33
L-grade prof. 1.39 .95 1.08 1.10 1.08
Non-man. workers .89 1.03 .96 .97 1.06
Manual workers 1.03 .85 .95 .95 .97
B- 2000
Farmers 1.07 .94 1.03 .96 .96
Artisans 1.06 1.06 1.05 .97 1.01
H-grade prof. 1.21 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.05
L-grade prof. 1.05 .98 .97 1.00 1.11
Non-man. workers .80 .94 .99 1.05 1.04
Manual workers .93 .87 .94 .97 .97
Notes : the table gives the mean income conditional on social origin and social destination divided by the mean income of
destination.
than other groups and non-wage earners experience faster growth. This indicates that the
return eect narrows the dispersion of mean incomes conditional on social origin. However, it
only accounts for part of the evolution. The observed reduction in mean income gaps is much
stronger when conditioning on social origin than when conditioning on social destination. For
instance the ratio between the mean disposable income of higher-grade professionals and manual
workers only falls from 2.04 to 1.92. When conditioning on social origin instead of destination,
it falls from 1.67 to 1.46.
To detect a relative return eect, we compute the ratio of the mean income conditional on
social origin and destination to the mean income conditional on social destination39. Table 5
shows that for almost every social destination, coming from a farmer or blue-collar background
represents a handicap in 1979. It is no more true for descendants of farmers in 2000. On the
opposite, originating from a high or low grade professional background represents a signicant
advantage which has decreased sharply at least for the former category over the period. On the
whole, the relative return eect may be registered as a source of decrease in EOP.
The contribution of the mobility, the absolute and the relative return eects to the observed
evolution can be identied using the Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) decomposition applied to equation
(5. As is well-known, the decomposition is not unique. To assess the contribution of changes in
, r or y, there are several possible choices of a reference period for the factors held constant.
39Farmers have been excluded from social destinations because of problems of statistical inference.
37Table 6: Decomposition of the evolution of the mean income
Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Change in mean income (1979-2000)
4481 1 553 -1 457 - 521 863 1 118
Mobility eect 704 -28 -906 -989 -167 -179
(%) 15 -1 62 189 -193 -16
Relative return eect 968 -95 -2154 -966 -355 -91
(%) 21 -6 147 185 -41 -8
Absolute return eect 2808 1677 1603 1435 1385 1388
(%) 62 107 -110 -275 160 124
Notes : Change in mean income in Euros 2002. The occupational group refers to social origin. H-grade prof. : higher-grade
professionals. L-grade prof. : lower-grade professionals. Non-man. workers : non-manual workers.
Taking the arithmetic average on all six possible decompositions, the change in mean income













































where j, rj and  yk denote the vectors (j1 jK), (rj1 rjK) and ( y1   yK). The terms A,
B and C arise from the averaging procedure. The rst term on the right hand-side of equation
6 is the mobility eect, the second is the relative return eect and the third one the absolute
return eect.
The results of the decompositions for the mean disposal incomes are given in Table 6. The
mobility and relative return eects contribute negatively to the change in the mean conditional
income for every category except for the children of farmers. On the contrary and as could have
been expected every social origin displays a positive absolute return eect, while its importance
is broadly comparable across social groups, the absolute return eect is much more important
for the children of farmers.
This pattern of results shows that mobility between categories as measured by the mobility
38eect and mobility within categories, measured by the relative return eect, are positively
correlated. Adding these two eects in a broad mobility concept, the following ranking of social
groups appears: children of farmers experience a large positive increase in their mean income
due to mobility. Next, the children of artisans display a slight decrease due to the same eect.
Children of non-manual workers witness a larger negative drop in their mean income and then
nally the children of lower-grade professionals and higher-grade professionals are much more
negatively hurt by mobility within and between groups.
5 Conclusion
While dierent ethical positions can be defended, regarding how to substantively dene equality
of opportunity, our analysis indicates that any denition relies on a partition of the determinants
of individual outcomes into three distinct groups : eort, which includes the determinants that
are seen as a legitimate source of outcome dierences; circumstances, which consist of the
determinants that should not lead, other things equal, to dierences in outcome; luck, which
comprises the random determinants that are seen as a fair source of inequality provided that
they are even-handed, with respect to circumstances. In this perspective, the generic model of
equality of opportunity developed in this paper appears as a general model, that encompasses
a variety of specic conceptions of equality of opportunity, depending on the precise empirical
characterization of the above three sets of factors. This model also makes clear that, once
these dierent sets have been delineated, there may still be several ways to dene equality of
opportunity, which correspond to the strong and weak criteria introduced here. These two
criteria are expressed in terms of stochastic dominance because luck is akin to a form of risk in
the realization of income that cannot be ignored.
Whatever the precise conception adopted, empirically assessing equality of opportunity turns
out to be a data-demanding exercise. To many, equality of opportunity appears as a more desir-
able social objective than equality of outcome because it takes into account the determinants of
observed outcomes. The obvious drawback of this conception is that making equality of oppor-
tunity judgments ideally requires that all the relevant determinants of outcome be observable.
Of course, this requirement will rarely be met and assessing equality of opportunity will most
likely take place under imperfect information on the relevant determinants. In this paper, we
exhibit two testable conditions of equality of opportunity that can be used in this context. Be-
cause these two conditions are expressed in terms of stochastic dominance, our general model,
incorporating luck, shapes our empirical strategy in a very distinctive manner, compared to the
39rest of the literature.
The rst criterion gives a necessary condition for the strong form of equality of opportunity.
The other is a sucient condition for the weak form. Only in very restrictive cases is it possible
to exhibit a necessary and sucient condition. Hence, in almost all cases, imperfect information
implies that equality of opportunity cannot be fully assessed. This is probably the price to pay
if we are willing to develop a rich enough view. It is also important to emphasize that these two
conditions still allow, in our empirical application, to provide a valuable assessment of equality
of opportunity in France. Even with limited information on the determinants of outcomes,
these conditions indicate that equality of opportunity is clearly violated. This conclusion would
therefore remain unchanged if we had access to a richer data set.
On the empirical side, this paper reveals that social inheritance is a deeply rooted source
of inequality in France over the period 1979-2000. Dierences in social origin translate into
signicant gaps of living conditions. Equality of opportunity in income acquisition does not
prevail, neither for primary income nor for disposable income. However, the degree of inequal-
ity of opportunity tends to decrease. During this period, the average gap between the most
advantaged social group, the children of higher-grade professionals, and the least advantaged
one fall by one half.40 The explanation of this evolution is addressed in a companion paper
(Lefranc et al. (2006)). We show that this reduction in inequality of opportunity does not arise
from a decrease in the degree of transmission of economic advantage from one generation to the
next. Over time, children tend to face more equal opportunities because of a fall in inequality
of outcomes among their parents.
Lastly, this paper has underlined an important phenomenon: the risk of social lotteries
appears very similar across the dierent groups of social origin. As a rst approximation, the
inuence of social origin on opportunities for income, in France, can be summarized by a scale
factor : individual income is determined by the product of a random variable - distributed
independently of social origin- and the mean income conditional on social origin. Whether a
similar determination of income opportunities is also at work in other countries is a question that
would be worth investigating. Future research should also analyze the theoretical explanation
and consequences of this important stylized fact.
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Stochastic dominance relationships can be easily expressed and statistically tested by making






For example D1(z) is the proportion of people whose income is below z; D2(z) measures for
the mean poverty gap, i.e. the mean amount that should be given to people below the poverty
line z, to reach this threshold.
The link between poverty indices and stochastic dominance has been established by Foster
and Shorrocks (1988). They have shown that stochastic dominance at the order g of distribution
FA over FB is equivalent to the situation where the poverty index of order g for FA is smaller
than the poverty index for FB, for all poverty lines. Letting SDg denote stochastic dominance
at the order g, we have, for g 2 IN+ :





Consequently, tests of stochastic dominance are equivalent to test of inequality for poverty
indices. The procedure adopted here follows Davidson and Duclos (2000) and consists in testing
such inequalities for a xed number, k, of poverty lines. The poverty lines used here are the
deciles and 95th percentile of the overall household income distribution.41
For a given poverty line z, an unbiased and asymptotically normal estimator for the poverty






(z   xi)g 1I(xi  z)
where i denotes the ith observation, N denotes the sample size and I() is an indicator function
equal to 1 when its argument is true, 0 otherwise. For some xed set of poverty lines fz1;:::;zkg,
let ^ Dg denote the vector of poverty indices ( ^ Dg(z1)::: ^ Dg(zk)) and  its asymptotic variance-
covariance matrix43.
The hypothesis of dominance at the order g between two distributions FA and FB can be




A) the dierence of the vectors of poverty
indices. Stochastic dominance at the order g can be test as : H0 :  2 IR
k
+ versus H1 : = 2 IR
k
+.
The test statistic is constructed from the estimated vector ^  =(^ D
g
B   ^ D
g
A), whose asymptotic




NB under the hypothesis of independence between
distributions A and B.
The null hypothesis is dened by a set of k constraints. Two approaches can be followed
to conduct this test. The rst consist in testing each of the k constraints separately. The
intersection of k sub-hypothesis is tested in each point where the distributions are compared.
This kind of test, called "intersection-union", is used for example in Bishop et al. (1992).
However, Dardanoni et Forcina (1999) and Davidson and Duclos (2000) have demonstrated
that this test procedure has relatively low power, since it ignores the covariance structure of the
vector ^ . The second approach, that will be followed here, amounts to simultaneously test the
k constraints, using a Wald test and explicitly taking into account the covariance structure of
the estimated poverty indices dierences vector. The general principle of the test amounts to
compare the distances between the estimated vector ^  to the sets dening respectively the null
41In order to use non-stochastic poverty lines, these percentiles are computed from administrative tax records
(the Revenus Fiscaux data) that are independent of the BDF survey.
42In our application this formula has been adapted to account for sample weights.
43See Davidson and Duclos (2000), theorem 1. p.1441 for the expression of this matrix.
44hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis. Of course, Wald tests can also be used to test the
equality of two distributions.
Equality tests The Wald test for the equality of two distributions is relatively easy to im-
plement and resort to a 2 test. The null hypothesis is given by H0 :  = 0. One can show
(Beach & Davidson 1983, Davidson & Duclos 2000) that under the null hypothesis, the vector
^  is asymptotically normal and we have :







Hence the test statistic T1 has the following asymptotic distribution under the null hypothesis:






) 1^   2
k
Stochastic dominance tests Stochastic dominance tests are more complex to implement
since in this case, the set corresponding to the null hypothesis is dened by an inequality
constraint. The hypothesis are given by: H0 :  2 IR
k
+ against H1 : = 2 IR
k
+. The Wald test
statistic with such constraints has been developed by Kodde and Palm (1986) and Wolak (1989).




jj^    jj
with jjxjj = x0 1x. Kodde and Palm (1986) have shown that the statistic T2 is distributed
as a mixture of 2 distributions:
T2  2 = k
j=0w(k;k   j;)Pr(2
j  c)
with w(k;k   j;) the probability that k   j elements of  are strictly positive. The
distribution of the 2 distribution have not been tabulated, but lower and upper bounds of
critical values are available. When these bounds do not allow to reach a conclusion we estimate
the critical values of the statistic T2 using Monte-Carlo simulation44.
44We draw 10.000 multivariate normal vectors with mean 0 and covariance matrix , and compute the propor-
tion of vectors with j positive elements (for j 2 (0;k)). This proportion is an estimate of the weight w(k;j;).
45B- Summary statistics and results for intermediate waves
Table A-1: Sample summary statistics
1979 1984 1989 1994 2000
Occupation of the father (%)
Farmers 21.65 18.23 15.69 12.95 10.55
Artisans 13.93 11.29 12.13 13.61 12.26
H-grade prof. 6.95 6.97 7.92 15.25 15.05
L-grade prof. 7.37 9.63 11.45 8.13 8.52
Non-man. workers 11.18 14.03 12.2 16.28 18.49
Manual workers 38.92 39.85 40.6 33.79 35.13
Obs Imputed 377 233 158 149 0
Mean Income
before imputation 16182 16428 17071 18276 18180
after imputation 16070 16590 17161 18178 18180
Obs 4231 4428 3529 4644 3984
Notes : mean income in Euros 2002. H-grade prof. : higher-grade
professionals. L-grade prof. : lower-grade professionals. Non-man.
workers : non-manual workers.
46Table A-2: Stochastic dominance tests 1984-1994
1984 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
Artisans - - <1 <1 <1 >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - >1 >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
1989 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
Artisans - - <1 <1 ? >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - >1 >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
1994 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 <1 >1
Artisans - - <1 ? >1 >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - = >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
Notes : The occupational group refers to social origin. H-grade prof. : higher-grade professionals. L-grade prof. : lower-grade professionals.
Non-man. workers : non-manual workers. Each element in the table indicates the result of the comparison of the income distribution of
the groups in row and column using the tests presented in section 4.2 :
>i: the row dominates the column for order i stochastic dominance ;
<i: the column dominates the row for order i stochastic dominance;
=: the distributions are equal;
?: the distributions cannot be ranked using rst and second order stochastic dominance.
47Table A-3: Lorenz dominance tests 1984-1994
1984 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - = = < < <
Artisans - - = ? = =
H-grade prof. - - - = = =
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - =
1989 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - = = = ? <
Artisans - - = = ? ?
H-grade prof. - - - = ? ?
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - ?
1994 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - = = < < <
Artisans - - = < < <
H-grade prof. - - - ? < <
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - =
Notes : The occupational group refers to social origin. H-grade prof. : higher-grade professionals. L-grade prof. : lower-grade professionals.
Non-man. workers : non-manual workers. Each element in the table indicates the result of the comparison of the Lorenz curves of the
groups in row and column using the criterion of Lorenz dominance :
>i: the row dominates the column for Lorenz dominance ;
<i: the column dominates the row for Lorenz dominance;
=: the Lorenz curves are equal;
?: the Lorenz curves cannot be ranked using Lorenz dominance.
48